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Quantum samplers are believed capa-
ble of sampling efficiently from distribu-
tions that are classically hard to sam-
ple from. We consider a sampler in-
spired by the classical Ising model. It
is nonadaptive and therefore experimen-
tally amenable. Under a plausible con-
jecture, classical sampling upto additive
errors from this model is known to be
hard. We present a trap-based verifica-
tion scheme for quantum supremacy that
only requires the verifier to prepare single-
qubit states. The verification is done
on the same model as the original sam-
pler, a square lattice, with only a con-
stant overhead. We next revamp our ver-
ification scheme in two distinct ways us-
ing fault tolerance that preserves the non-
adaptivity. The first has a lower over-
head based on error correction with the
same threshold as universal quantum com-
putation. The second has a higher over-
head but an improved threshold (1.97%)
based on error detection. We show that
classically sampling upto additive errors is
likely hard in both these schemes. Our
results are applicable to other sampling
problems such as the Instantaneous Quan-
tum Polynomial-time (IQP) computation
model. They should also assist near-term
attempts at experimentally demonstrating
quantum supremacy and guide long-term
ones.
1 Introduction
Considerable experimental efforts are being di-
rected towards the realisation of quantum infor-
mation processing technologies, with the eventual
Theodoros Kapourniotis: T.Kapourniotis@warwick.ac.uk
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aim of constructing universal quantum computers
and simulators [35, 37, 48, 49]. One of the mo-
tivations for this exercise is their expected abil-
ity to simulate physical systems that are believed
to be intractable classically [18, 27]. An exam-
ple of such a system is a lattice of interacting
spins in the presence of a magnetic field, repre-
sented by the classical Ising model [44], which is
a workhorse in condensed matter physics and sta-
tistical physics [8, 51, 66].
Computing the partition function of the Ising
model in an external magnetic field is, however,
#P-hard even in two spatial dimensions with
multiplicative approximations [34, 39]. #P-hard
problems are not expected to be solvable effi-
ciently on a universal quantum computer. Sam-
pling up to multiplicative [9, 13, 25, 70] and ad-
ditive [1, 7, 12, 36, 56, 58] errors from certain
distributions, such as from the partition func-
tion of the Ising model at imaginary tempera-
tures, is possible using devices that do not re-
quire the full complement of DiVincenzo’s crite-
ria [23] for their implementation. Their scalable
implementation is thus anticipated to be more
achievable than a universal quantum computer’s,
providing tangible demonstrations of quantum
supremacy sooner [9, 15, 32, 50, 68]. This ex-
pectation is purchased at the price of sacrific-
ing the full power of universal quantum com-
puters, promising only to efficiently sample from
certain distributions instead. This is the remit
of ‘quantum supremacy’ [62] but the relative ex-
perimental ease introduces new theoretical chal-
lenges [41].
Given the significance of quantum supremacy
in wider quantum information science, demon-
strating it experimentally is vital. In the
real world however, this faces two crucial chal-
lenges [2, 41] that arise from experimental imper-
fections and noise respectively. The first is veri-
fying that the output distribution is correct, or at
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least close to correct. Since any real world experi-
ment will be imperfect, establishing correctness is
important, particularly so since sampling, unlike
for instance integer factoring, is not in NP whose
correctness can be checked efficiently. This calls
for a verification scheme with minimal trust as-
sumptions, that indicates whether or not the out-
put distribution is sufficiently close in total vari-
ation distance to the ideal one, and consequently
whether or not an experiment has successfully
demonstrated quantum supremacy. The hurdle
is to ensure that the verifiable supremacy exper-
iment no more demanding than the original non-
verifiable experiment. This requires a redesign of
verification schemes for universal quantum com-
puting [4, 16, 29].
The second challenge arises because all experi-
ments are noisy. Arguing for experimental quan-
tum supremacy is incumbent on the sampling
task being classically hard to simulate even in
the presence of noise. As excessive noise can ren-
der a hard probability distribution easy to simu-
late, it is an important challenge to determine to
what extent a sampling task remain hard to sim-
ulate classically, even in the presence of noise [41].
The hurdle therefore is to retain hardness in the
presence of noise. This is what fault-tolerance
provides. Of course, this is only worthwhile for
experiments if the fault-tolerance threshold for
verifiable quantum supremacy is strictly easier
to achieve than that of universal quantum com-
putation. Furthermore, the overheads needed
for fault-tolerant verifiable quantum supremacy
must be less demanding than that for universal
quantum computation. Fault-tolerant quantum
supremacy is thus a compelling milestone on the
way to a fault-tolerant universal quantum com-
puter.
Among the numerous quantum supremacy can-
didates [41] are IQP [13] and those allowing sam-
pling from the distribution of partition functions
of the classical Ising model at imaginary tem-
perature - the Ising sampler [36]. IQP and the
Ising sampler exhibit in line with other mod-
els [1, 9, 25, 34], under plausible conjectures, a
highly unexpected collapse of the polynomial hi-
erarchy to the third level occurs if a classical
sampler can sample the partition function dis-
tribution upto additive errors. The Ising Sam-
pler is a constant-depth version of IQP, with the
additional favourable properties of translational-
invariance and single-instance. Single-instance
means that the hardness results hold for a sin-
gle fixed instance of the problem, relieving the
burden of creating random instances such as Bo-
son Sampling [1] and Random Sampling [9]. This
simplifies both theoretical analysis and experi-
mental implementation. Although the partition
function at imaginary temperatures may appear
unphysical, it has deep connections to quantum
complexity theory [39] as well as quantum statis-
tical and condensed matter physics via analytic
continuations [51]. It is the combination of rel-
ative ease in theoretical analysis and experimen-
tal implementations allied with its strong connec-
tions to physics that motivates our choice of the
Ising Sampler as the subject of this paper.
In this paper, we provide a fault-tolerant
scheme for the verification of quantum supremacy
in the Ising sampler. We achieve this by amal-
gamating trap-based quantum verification tech-
niques [29] with recent results on demonstrat-
ing quantum supremacy by emulating fault tol-
erance via post-selection [32]. In response to
the first challenge above, we present a nonadap-
tive verification scheme with exponentially low
probability of failure and only linear complex-
ity for the Ising sampler (prover). Our scheme
applies to any untrusted prover with entangling
and measuring capabilities, limited only by the
laws of quantum mechanics, and requires the ver-
ifier to prepare random, single-qubit states with
bounded local noise. We first present a verifica-
tion scheme that should aid demonstrating quan-
tum supremacy with few qubits (Theorem 1). In
response to the second challenge above, we prove
fault-tolerant versions (Theorem 2), one of which
uses the idea of emulated fault tolerance by post-
selection [32]. This ‘free’ post-selection enables
us to provide a fault-tolerant verification scheme
with improved thresholds over universal quantum
computing thresholds. An important property
of our verification is that it itself is within the
instantaneous model of quatum computing and
therefore can be implemented in the same de-
vice as the Ising sampler with small modifica-
tions. Moreover, we prove quantum supremacy
of this modified model (Theorem 3).
1.1 Comparison to prior work and structure
We go beyond Ref. [29] in three ways, namely
(i) providing a new definition of verifiability over
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many i.i.d. repetitions of the protocol, based
on the total variation distance between the out-
put distribution and the correct one; (ii) using
the Raussendorf-Harrington-Goyal (RHG) strat-
egy for fault tolerance instead of using it for prob-
ability amplification; and (iii) developing a sim-
pler construction for verification and computa-
tion on separate planar graphs.
We go beyond Ref. [32] by (i) solving one of its
open problems – proving quantum supremacy of
improved threshold fault-tolerant model up to ad-
ditive errors (Theorem 3) and (ii) verifying quan-
tum supremacy while maintaining its improved
thresholds.
Our work is a significant improvement over the
verification method of Ref. [36] on two counts.
Firstly, our schemes require a linear overhead in
the number of qubits as opposed to a quadratic
one in Ref [36]. Secondly, our schemes (fault-
tolerant ones) scale in the face of constant local
noise while that of Ref [36] requires local noise
polynomially small in the total number of qubits.
Our verification schemes apply to any nonadap-
tive sampler based on cluster states, however we
will use the Ising sampler [36] as a particular
example, thus keeping the benefit of the single
instance property and experimental feasibility of
this model.
Our work is structured as follows. Section 2
defines verifiability based on the total variation
distance of the output distribution. Section 3
provides an overview of the Ising sampler placed
in an a cryptographic setting of a prover and
a verifier. Section 4 contains the first of our
main results on the verification of the Ising sam-
pler’s output. We present a non-fault-tolerant
verification scheme (Theorem 1). Since it re-
quires decreasing noise in preparation, entangle-
ment and measurement with increasing system
size, this is only viable in small-sized experimen-
tal demonstrations of quantum supremacy. In
Section 5 we present two fault-tolerant versions
of the verification scheme (Theorem 2) which are
scalable when noise is below certain thresholds.
Section 6 provides a result (Theorem 3) on the
quantum supremacy of the output distribution of
the noisy Ising sampler conditioned on syndrome
measurements accepting, which is a generalisa-
tion of Ref. [32] for additive errors.
2 Verifiability
We begin with our definition of a verification pro-
tocol.
Definition 1 (Verification protocol). A verifica-
tion protocol involves two parties - a trusted veri-
fier and an untrusted prover who share a quantum
and classical channel. The protocol takes as in-
put a description of a computation and outputs a
string and a bit. The bit determines if the string
is accepted or rejected.
Establishing verifiability of a protocol consists
of proving completeness and soundness. A proto-
col is complete if, for an honest prover, the verifier
outputs the correct result and accepts. A proto-
col is sound if, for any deviation of the prover, the
probability that the verifier outputs an incorrect
result and accepts is low. This deviation captures
both a malevolent prover who tries to cheat and
uncontrollable errors in the prover’s device.
Note that the above notion of verifiability relies
on an output string being correct while sampling
relies on distributions being close. We are there-
fore interested in the total variation distance be-
tween the experimental output distribution and
the exact one [29]. We are furthermore inter-
ested in arguing for quantum supremacy based
on the total variation distance between distribu-
tions. This requires us to go from a joint distri-
bution of a string and a bit to a probability distri-
bution over strings conditioned on a bit. To meet
these demands we introduce the idea of a veri-
fication scheme, that uses a protocol as a black
box and can call it repeatedly. We also assume
that the repetitions of the protocols are indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). However,
there is no assumption on the behaviour of the
system within the protocol, which means that an
adversarial prover can cheat by correlating sys-
tems within the protocol.
Definition 2 (Verification scheme). A verifica-
tion scheme takes as input a verification protocol,
M ∈ N, l ∈ [0, 1] and outputs a string and a bit.
The bit determines if the string is accepted or re-
jected.
A verification scheme works as follows. After
running M i.i.d repetitions of a verification pro-
tocol it outputs one of the M output strings at
random and accepts if at least a fraction l of the
protocols accept and rejects otherwise.
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Let qnsy(x) be the experimental and qexc(x)
be the exact distribution of the output x of a
sampler. We are interested in the quantity
var ≡ 12
∑
x
|qexc(x)− qnsy(x)|, (1)
where the sum is over all binary strings x of size
N .
The following definition captures the notions
of completeness and soundness at the level of a
scheme for sampling problems.
Definition 3 (Verifiability of a scheme). A
scheme is verifiable if its output is
• (δ′, δ)−complete: For an honest prover hav-
ing only bounded noise, the scheme accepts
at least with probability δ′, and
var ≤ 1− δ (2)
for the output string.
• (ε′, ε)−sound: For any, including adversar-
ial, prover if the scheme accepts then
var ≤ ε (3)
with confidence ε′.
We then consider the verifiability of a scheme
for a sampler which has a designated output reg-
ister we call the post-selection register. We con-
sider probabilities qnsy(x|y = 0), where y is the
value of the post-selection register, for the exper-
imental and qexc(x|y = 0) for the exact distribu-
tion of a sampler, conditioned on y being zero.
We are interested in the quantity
varPost ≡ 12
∑
x
|qexc(x|y = 0)− qnsy(x|y = 0)|.
(4)
Again, the sums are over all binary strings x of
size N . We adapt our definition to conditional
probabilities as follows.
Definition 4 (Verifiability of a scheme for
post-selected distribution). A scheme is verifi-
able conditioned on the post-selection register be-
ing zero, if its output is
• (δ′, δ)−complete: For an honest prover hav-
ing only bounded noise, the scheme accepts
at least with probability δ′, and
varPost ≤ 1− δ (5)
for the the output string.
• (ε′, ε)−sound: For any, including adversar-
ial, prover if the scheme accepts, then
varPost ≤ ε (6)
with confidence ε′.
3 Quantum sampling in the verifier-
prover setting
In the verifier-prover setting, the verifier can pre-
pare bounded-error, single-qubit states and the
prover implements the rest of the computation
including the measurements, and returns the out-
put samples to the verifier. The role of the veri-
fier is to ascertain if the prover is acting honestly
and executing the correct operation. The prover
is, in general, malicious, trying to pass any tests
designed by the verifier while deviating from the
correct implementation at the same time. This
malice may be intentional if the prover is trying to
convince the verifier of its quantum power when
it has none, or incidental if the prover possesses
an imperfect quantum device prone to noise and
errors. We assume that the prover’s deviations
are governed by quantum mechanics.
We begin by adapting the Ising spin model to
a blind verifier-prover cryptographic setting [17].
Blindness, which ensures that the prover remains
ignorant of the actual computation, is a necessary
ingredient in our verification scheme. Our Ising
spin model consists of qubits in state |+〉 sub-
ject to nearest neighbour controlled pi-phase rota-
tions, denoted by cZ. All the qubits are measured
simultaneously in a basis in the xy-plane of the
Bloch sphere. The measurement outcome of clas-
sical bits is the output sample. This model cor-
responds to the well-studied measurement-based
quantum computing (MBQC) model [64] with-
out the adaptive measurements. This last restric-
tion makes the depth of the computation constant
on the size of the input: one round of prepa-
ration, three rounds of entangling because the
maximum degree of the graph is three and one
round of non-adaptive measurements. This re-
laxes DiVincenzo’s criteria of long decoherence
times and makes this model non-universal for
quantum computing.
In the particular Ising sampler presented in [36]
the structure of the graph state is fixed (Fig. (1)),
but its size scales with the width m and depth n.
The measurement angles are also fixed to specific
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values from the set {−pi/4,−pi/8, 0, pi/8, pi/4}.
This choice of graph, which we call the ‘ex-
tended’ brickwork state, and a fixed angle for each
physical qubit has the following benefit: Each
possible combination of measurement outcomes
‘chooses’ a different angle for each qubit of the
original brickwork state from the set {kpi/4},
k = {0, . . . , 7}. This effectively makes a single
instance of the model a random quantum circuit
generator, a property exploited to prove its hard-
ness.
The correspondence to an Ising model comes
from the locality of spin interactions and decom-
posing each MBQC measurement into a unitary
rotation around the z-axis corresponding to an
external magnetic field, followed by a Pauli X
measurement. The quantum state just before the
PauliX measurement is given by the unitary evo-
lution due to the Hamiltonian
H = −
∑
〈i,j〉
JZiZj +
∑
i
BiZi (7)
where J is the interaction term, Bi the local field
strength and Zi the Pauli Z operator on qubit i.
The probability qexc(x) of measuring a bit
string x corresponds to the partition function
Zx of the Ising model with Hamiltonian H′ ≡
H+ pi2
∑
i xiZi and is given by
qexc(x) = |Tr(e
−i(H+pi2
∑
i
xiZi))|2
22N ≡
|Zx|2
22N , (8)
where N = mn. The second term in H′ comes
from the measurement outcomes of the Pauli X
measurements, and the partition function is eval-
uated at an imaginary temperature β = 1/kBT =
i.
Testing the honesty of the prover, in our case
the Ising sampler, requires the ‘blind’ injection of
certain ‘trap’ qubits. To keep the identity of these
trap qubits from the prover, the verifier applies
some encoding on the original translationally-
invariant Ising spin model, making the model
translationally variant. Now both the participat-
ing qubits and the measurement angles on the
graph state have a randomly chosen extra rota-
tion according to the scheme described next.
Specifically, each qubit i is individually pre-
pared by the verifier in the state |+θi〉 , where θi
is chosen uniformly at random from the set A =
{0, pi8 , 2pi8 , . . . , 15pi8 }. Instead of the prover measur-
ing in fixed predetermined angles, as in the orig-
inal Ising sampler, the verifier sends encrypted
angles to the prover: δi = θi + (−1)r′iφi + ripi for
ri, r
′
i ∈R {0, 1}, where ∈R stands for a uniform
random selection. Rotations by θi on the qubit
and on the angles mutually cancel and the classi-
cal information that the prover receives (contain-
ing the actual measurement angles φi) is classi-
cally one time padded by θi. The bits ri, r′i pro-
vide some extra randomness to restrict the infor-
mation the prover gets from the quantum state
and can be corrected by classical post-processing
of the sample. Our difference from Ref. [17] lies
in the number of angles used in the set A, and
comes from the fact that we use a different de-
composition of the computation. We conjecture
that this can be improved upon (See Sec. 7).
4 Non-fault-tolerant Verification of
Ising Sampler
The output of a quantum sampler must be clas-
sical for it to be comparable to that of a classical
sampler, a prerequisite for demonstrating quan-
tum supremacy. This allows us to simplify trap-
based verification strategies for universal quan-
tum computation [29, 46, 47] to having disjointed
computational resource and trap states - an idea
also used in Ref. [47] and in circuit-based verifi-
cation [16]. This permits an exponentially small
error in our estimation of the fidelity of the out-
put using a square lattice. Finally, a trap-based
technique instead of fidelity-witness based cer-
tification ones [36, 40], similar also to [5, 20],
enables us to reduce the resource complexity of
the verification protocol from quadratic to lin-
ear. Other certification methods that require lin-
ear resources exist, by trusting the measuring de-
vices [26, 42, 54, 60] instead of preparation. Lin-
ear resource complexity is minimal in this sce-
nario because the verifier needs to receive at least
one copy of the resource state to perform the com-
putation.
Our verification protocol relies on judiciously
selecting the measurement angles and placing
dummy qubits prepared in the state |0〉, which,
together with xy-plane measurements, allows us
to carve different types of graphs from a square
lattice graph, as shown in Fig. (3). Placing one
dummy qubit between any two other qubits pre-
vents the prover’s entangling operators to have
any entangling effect between the participating
qubits, so the prover can apply exactly the same
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(i)
=
=
pi/8 0 −pi/4 0 pi/4 0 −pi/8
(ii)
Figure 1: The original brickwork state (i) is a univer-
sal resource for MBQC under xy-plane measurements,
where white vertices represent qubits and the edges rep-
resent cZ operations. The ‘extended’ brickwork state
(ii) is used in the original Ising sampler [36], where each
white vertex is replaced by 7 physical qubits (black ver-
tices). The measurement angle for each qubit is fixed
to the value written above each vertex. There is no
adaptation of the angles based on previous measurement
outcomes as in universal MBQC.
operations that produce the square lattice but
create a different graph state. The graphs carved
out are the ‘extended’ brickwork state (Fig. (1))
and two other graphs containing special ‘trap’
qubits in the state |+〉 . The extended brickwork
state is used to run the Ising sampler. The traps
in the trap graphs are measured in the same basis
as prepared, yielding a deterministic check on the
prover. Two different types of the trap graphs are
needed to enable placing a trap at any position in
the graph with equal probability. The order of the
graphs is chosen at random and the whole pro-
tocol implemented blindly to thwart the prover
from distinguishing trap and target computation
qubits.
A sketch of our Protocol 1 appears in Fig. (2),
and the details in Sec. 4.1. The protocol has con-
stant time complexity of the quantum operations
and needs O(N) qubits, where N is the number
of the qubits of the Ising sampler.
Noise considered in all our protocols for an hon-
est prover is local, unital and bounded. It ap-
plies after every elementary operation (prepara-
tion, entangling and measurement) j and is ex-
pressed as a CPTP superoperator:
Nj = (1− V,P )I + Ej (9)
where V,P = V and ||Ej || = V for the noise
of the verifier (preparation noise) and V,P = P
1. Verifier selects a random ordering of 2κ+
1 graphs, one for target computation and κ
from each type of trap graphs.
2. Verifier prepares, one by one, the qubits
needed for the blind implementation of the
2κ + 1 cluster states and sends them to the
prover.
3. Verifier sends the encrypted measure-
ment angles to the prover.
4. Prover entangles all received qubits in
the 2κ+ 1 cluster states.
5. Prover measures all qubits simultane-
ously in the instructed angles and returns
the results.
6. Verifier decrypts the outputs and accepts
if all trap results are correct, otherwise re-
jects.
Figure 2: Nonadaptive verification protocol
and ||Ej || = P for the noise of the honest prover
(entangling and measurement noise).
Theorem 1 (Non-fault tolerance verification
scheme). There exists a verification scheme with
Protocol 1, M = log(1/β)/(2κ2N2(V + P )2),
l = (1−κN(2V +4P )) that according to Def. (3)
is (
1− β, 1−
√
N(V + 3P )
)
− complete
and(
1− β,
√
κN(3V + 5P ) + ∆κ
)
− sound,
where ∆κ = κ!(κ+ 1)!/(2κ+ 1)!.
In the above, V and P are fixed by the experi-
mental capability, while completeness and sound-
ness parameters are set by the conjectures in-
voked to argue for quantum supremacy, as ob-
tained in Eqn. (18).
A proof sketch appears in Section 4.3 and a full
proof in Appendix B.
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Using our verifiable quantum sampler to
demonstrate quantum supremacy is underwrit-
ten by results which show that approximating
the Ising sampler upto constant total variation
distance is hard classically, subject to an aver-
age case hardness and an anti-concentration con-
jecture, presented in Section 6, similarly to the
original model [36].
Both κNV and κNP must be constant for
the total variation distances to be constant, plus
exponentially decaying in κ term ∆κ in sound-
ness, in Theorem 1. To achieve this we require
local errors V and P to decrease linearly with
the number of qubits and κ. This is only realistic
in quantum supremacy experiments involving a
few qubits.
To overcome this restriction, we consider fault-
tolerant versions of our verification protocol in
Section 5.
4.1 Protocol
The following is a full description of the non-fault
tolerant verification protocol:
Protocol 1:
1. Verifier selects a random ordering of 2κ + 1
graphs, one for computation and 2κ for test-
ing, as in Fig. (3). This fixes the position of
computational basis qubits called the dummy
qubits (see Appendix A) and the measure-
ment angles {φi}Ni=1, where N = m × n is
the total number of qubits, so that
(a) in the target computation graph we carve
from the square lattice a universal resource
state, the ‘extended’ brickwork state of Fig-
ure (1) and fix the rest of the measurement
angles according to the Ising sampler model;
(b) in the trap computation graphs the
dummy qubits are used to isolate the traps,
which are placed at fixed positions. For half
of the graphs in positions with odd parity
that correspond to non-dummy qubits in the
computational graph and in the other half in
positions with even parity that correspond
to non-dummies in the computational graph.
The traps are measured with angles φ = 0 so
that the measurement is deterministic. Cru-
cially, the trap graphs do not contain any
‘bridge’ operations so there is no need for
adaptive corrections.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Figure 3: Verifier chooses a random ordering of 2κ + 1
graph states - the computational graph on the right of
figure (i); κ identical trap graphs on the right of figure
(ii) which have traps (starred nodes) on the even parity
positions of the sub-graph that corresponds to the com-
putational graph; and κ identical graphs on the right of
figure (iii) which have traps on the odd parity positions
of the sub-graph that corresponds to the computational
graph. All of these graphs can be generated from a
square lattice (on the left) by replacing |+〉 qubits with
|0〉 at the positions (isolated dot nodes) we do not want
entangled with their neighbours when cZ is applied. Fur-
ther detail on the carving procedure, which can be made
blind (Section 3), is provided in Appendix A.
2. Verifier prepares the qubits that compose the
cluster state one by one and sends them to
the prover.
(a) The dummy qubits are prepared in {|di〉 :
di ∈R {0, 1}}.
(b) The rest of the qubits are prepared
in Zdk∼j |+θj 〉 = 1√2(|0〉 + ei(θj+dk∼jpi) |1〉),
where θj is chosen uniformly at random from
the set A = {0, pi8 , 2pi8 , . . . , 15pi8 }} and dk∼j is
the parity of the d’s of all neighbours of j.
Notice that the set A is different from the
original trap-based protocol of Ref. [29].
3. Verifier sends the encrypted computational
measurement angles to the prover: δi =
θi + (−1)r′iφi + ripi for ri, r′i ∈R {0, 1}. Pa-
rameters ri, r′i create a classical one-time pad
on measurement outputs.
Accepted in Quantum 2019-06-25, click title to verify 7
4. Prover entangles all received qubits accord-
ing to the 2κ+1 cluster states, each of dimen-
sion n ×m, by applying cZ gates for every
edge of each cluster.
5. Prover measures all qubits simultaneously in
angles δi and returns the measurement re-
sults to the verifier.
6. Verifier applies a bit flip to the output bit i
when ri = 1 and to its (non-dummy) neigh-
bours when r′i = 1 to undo the classical one
time pad. The output string x of the mea-
surements of the target computation is the
output of the protocol. The verifier sets an
extra bit to accept if all the traps give the
correct result (decoded measurement result
0).
A variation of the protocol can have the prover
to entangle all the graphs directly in the ‘ex-
tended brickwork state’ instead of the square lat-
tice state. This leaks no extra more information
to the prover from what is publicly known. How-
ever, we seek a more generic prover and keep the
protocol as presented.
The resource count of the protocol is as follows.
The number of qubits prepared by the verifier
and sent to the prover one at a time is (2κ+ 1)N
where N is the original size of the computation.
The classical information exchanged is linear in
N and can be sent in one round. Similarly the
classical outcomes of the measurements can be
sent in one go. The prover is required to entangle
all neighbouring qubits in a square lattice and
apply single qubit measurements in the xy-plane.
4.2 Proof of Completeness
To prove completeness we assume that the prover
honestly follows the prescribed steps (up to
bounded noise). Before considering the noisy
case, we show that for the noiseless prover, the
fidelity of the target computation and the trap
computation to the correct ones are both unity.
We begin with a circuit diagram of the opera-
tions on the prover’s side in Fig. (4). Any mea-
surement by angle {δi} for the prover is mathe-
matically decomposed into a z-rotation (Rz) con-
trolled by δi and a Pauli X measurement. With-
out loss of generality, since everything before the
measurements is unitary we can assume that even
UB
|+θ1〉
|di−1〉
Zdi+1Zdi−1 |+θi〉
|di+1〉
|+θ(2κ+1)N 〉
|δ1〉
|δ(2κ+1)N 〉
|0〉⊗|B|
/
/
/
Rz
Rz
Rz
Rz
Rz
X
X
X
X
X
Figure 4: The inputs, other than prover’s private system
|0〉⊗|B| , are the qubits prepared by the verifier in steps
1-3 of Protocol 1, for both target and trap rounds. We
represent the prover’s operation (steps 4-6 in Protocol
1) upon their receipt. Qubit at position i is a trap qubit
surrounded by dummy qubits at positions i− 1 and i+
1. UB is an arbitrary unitary deviation on the prover’s
system. When prover is honest UB = I.
a dishonest prover will apply the correct unitary
operators and then chose his deviation UB on
all systems, including his private qubits |0〉⊗|B|.
Since we are proving completeness in this section,
we assume UB = I. The measurement angles δi
received by the prover are represented as compu-
tational basis multi-qubit states |δi〉.
The circuit in Fig. (4) can be simplified in
a number of ways, resulting in the circuit of
Fig. (5). The cZ gates between the dummy qubits
and their neighbours cancel the Pauli Z pre-
rotation on the neighbours. Also, we can write
explicitly the rotation angles on each of the con-
trolled Rz gates and remove the control lines.
Further simplification follows when the z-
rotations by θi which are part of the Rz gates
and the z-rotations by θi applied by the ver-
ifier to the qubits before sending them to the
prover mutually cancel after commuting with the
cZ gates. Notice that the dummy qubits are an
exception since θi rotations remain but have no
effect other than a global phase. Moreover, we
can extract the Pauli operators from the Rz by
Accepted in Quantum 2019-06-25, click title to verify 8
UB
|+θ1〉
|di−1〉
|+θi〉
|di+1〉
|+θN′ 〉
|δ1〉
|δN ′〉
|0〉⊗|B|
/
/
/
Rz(θ1 + (−1)r′1φ1 + r1pi)
Rz(θi−1 + ri−1pi)
Rz(θi + ripi)
Rz(θi+1 + ri+1pi)
Rz(θN ′ + (−1)r
′
N′φN ′ + rN ′pi)
X
X
X
X
X
Figure 5: When applying the corresponding entangling
operations in Fig. (4), dummy qubits at positions i− 1
and i+1 have the effect of isolating their neighbours and
cancelling the neighbours’ pre-rotations that depend on
parameters di−1, di+1 (here the only neighbour depicted
is the trap qubit at position i). Also, unitary rotations
of Fig. (4) are written explicitly. Remember that for
dummy and trap qubits angles φ take value 0. For clarity
of the figure we have used N ′ ≡ (2κ+ 1)N .
applying identities: Rz(−χ) = XRz(χ)X and
Rz(χ + pi) = ZRz(χ). The Pauli X operators
from the left hand side of Rz can be rewritten as
Z rotations on their entangled neighbours. This
results in the circuit diagram depicted in Fig. (6).
Notice that the remaining Pauli X operators do
not have any effect on the Pauli X measurements
(we recall that in this proof UB = I) and the
Pauli Z operators flip the measurement results.
Let us denote all the measurement outcomes
of the protocol except the dummy qubit measure-
ments by the binary vector x and p(x) the proba-
bility of obtaining it. Let qexc(x) denote the exact
probability of obtaining x in an non-encrypted
MBQC implementation using the same measure-
ment pattern {φ}Ni as input. The only difference
between the actual and the non-encrypted case
are the Pauli Z operators before the measure-
ments, which flip the outcomes. Therefore, by
relabelling the probabilities p(x) to p(x′), where
x′i = xi⊕ ri⊕
∑
j r
′
j∼i, we get qexc(x) = p(x′). In
UB
|+〉
|0〉
|+〉
|0〉
|+〉
|δ1〉
|δN ′〉
|0〉⊗|B|
/
/
/
Rz(φ1)
Xdi−1
Xdi+1
Rz(φN ′)
Xr
′
1
Rz(θi−1)
Xr
′
i
Rz(θi+1)
Xr
′
N′
Z
r1+
∑
j∼1 r
′
j
Zri−1
Zri
Zri+1
Z
rN′+
∑
j∼N′ r
′
j
X
X
X
X
X
Figure 6: Each z-rotation by θ in Fig. (5) undoes the
corresponding pre-rotations of the qubits (except for the
dummies that have no pre-rotation by θ). For any qubit
k, operations in the form Rz((−1)r′kφk) in Fig. (5) can
be written as Xr′kRz(φk)Xr
′
k and the Xr′k before (in
temporal order) when commuting with the entangle-
ment operators can be written as Zr′k on the neigh-
bours (this has an effect on qubits 1 and N ′ in this
figure). All Pauli operators here are written separately
from z−rotations. Notice that we can write an extra
Xr
′
i , with r′i ∈R {0, 1}, applying on the trap qubit i
since X |+〉 = |+〉.
other words, in the noiseless case, we can sample
from the exact distribution by simply correcting
the bit flips caused by the random Pauli Z, which
are known to the verifier.
In MBQC, we can also write the distribution in
terms of unitaries, labelled by the measurement
outcomes (the so-called branches of the MBQC
computation) of all the layers except the last. For
dimension m× n, we have (up to global phases)
qexc(x) =
| 〈x(n−1)m+1, . . . , xnm|Ux1,...,x(n−1)m |+1, . . . ,+m〉 |2
2(n−1)m
(10)
since all the computational branches
(x1, . . . , x(n−1)m) are equiprobable and they
define a unitary operation on the input [19]. For
the trap qubits this distribution is deterministic
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since each qubit is prepared in the |+〉 state,
remains isolated throughout the computation
and is measured in the |±〉 basis.
Now, consider local bounded noise of the form
of Eqn. (9) after every elementary operation j,
including preparation, entangling and measure-
ment. The operations that can introduce noise in
a single round of the protocol include N prepa-
rations at the verifier’s end and at most 2N en-
tanglements and N measurements at the prover’s
end. This is an upper bound of 4N operations.
The fidelity F 2c of the noisy output of the tar-
get computation to the noiseless one (which is
the correct one as we proved above) cannot be
smaller than 1 − (NV + 3NP ). Since for any
two states ρ, σ, D(ρ, σ) ≤ √1− F 2(ρ, σ), this is
an upper bound in total variation distance for the
target computation 1− δ = √N(V + 3P ).
Completeness means that our scheme should
accept with high probability in the case of
bounded noise. The acceptance of the scheme,
according to Def. (2), depends on our estimate
F̂ 2t of the acceptance probability of the protocol
F 2t . Given the above bounded noise, F 2t cannot
be smaller than 1− κN(V + 3P ).
Our estimate for F 2t comes from M i.i.d. rep-
etitions of the protocol. By Hoeffding’s inequal-
ity, repeating M = log(1/β)/(2κ2N2(V + P )2)
times gets us κN(V +P )-close in our estimation
with confidence 1−β. In order to have high prob-
ability of acceptance we need to set the limit for
accepting the estimate to (1−κ(2NV + 4NP )).
Then our probability of accepting is as high as
our confidence. Setting this limit is necessary to
get high completeness but will have an effect in
the soundness.
4.3 Proof of Soundness
The proof of soundness of Theorem 1 is based
on the fact that the fraction of accepting proto-
cols, F̂ 2t , is a good estimator of a lower bound in
the fidelity F 2c of the target computation. Thus,
looking at F̂ 2t gives us with high confidence a
lower bound on the fidelity, or similarly an upper
bound on total variation distance var, as defined
in Eq. (1).
We outline the main arguments employed to
prove this theorem in stages here, and provide
the explicit algebraic derivations in Appendix B.
Firstly, a unitary deviation UB applied be-
fore the measurements, depicted in Fig. (6), cap-
tures in all generality the prover’s dishonesty.
To see this, consider the case when the prover
performs measurements different from the honest
ones. This corresponds to applying a unitary ba-
sis rotation followed by Pauli X measurements.
Then, UB applies also on the prover’s private
subsystem so he can use this power to replace
the qubits he receives with any other qubits he
chooses to prepare privately. In any case, he has
to report some classical measurement results so
we always keep the final Pauli X measurements
in the picture. Our proof should therefore apply
to any choice of UB.
Secondly, we bound the total variation distance
of the output distribution via the trace distance
D(ρc, ρ′c), where ρc represents the state of the
computational system just after the PauliX mea-
surements if the prover is honest and ρ′c the same
state if the prover is dishonest. Thus,
var ≤ D(ρc, ρ′c) ≤
√
1− F 2(ρc, ρ′c)
=
√
1− Tr2(
√
ρcρ′c) (11)
The main idea leading to the statement of the
theorem is that the acceptance probability F 2t mi-
nus a lower bound on the fidelity of the computa-
tional system F 2(ρc, ρ′c) is small, when averaged
over the random parameters. Therefore, by es-
timating F 2t (by counting the fraction of accep-
tances over many repetitions of the protocol), we
get a good estimate of a lower bound on the fi-
delity of the computational system and therefore
an upper bound on var. We begin our analysis for
the case of perfect preparations and subsequently
incorporate the effect of noise.
Averaged over the random parameters, the
probability of getting all trap outcomes 1, sum-
ming over the random variables ri, r′i, di and θi,
is calculated in Appendix B as
F 2t =
∑
t
p(t)
∑
k
|αk|2
∏
i∈t
| 〈+|i Pk|i |+〉i |2, (12)
where t is the vector of the indices of the posi-
tions of the traps in all 2κ trap systems and ∑t
takes all possible values allowed by the construc-
tion with equal probability p(t). The summation
over the random parameters results in the attack
on the trap system to be transformed into a con-
vex combination of Pauli operators Pk, each with
probability |αk|2. By Pk|i we represent the Pauli
operator that applies on qubit i.
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The average fidelity Fc of the computational
system is
Fc ≡
∑
r,θ,t
p(r,θ, t)F (ρc, ρ′c) (13)
=
∑
r,θ,t
p(r,θ, t)Tr(
√
ρcρ′c), (14)
where ρc and ρ′c represent the honest and dishon-
est state of the target computation just after the
Pauli X measurements. Calculation, presented in
detail in Appendix B, leads to
F 2c ≥
∑
t
p(t)
∑
k
|αk|2
∏
i∈c(t)
| 〈+|i Pk|i |+〉i |2
(15)
where c(t) denotes the positions of the qubits
that participate in the computation and depends
on the random ordering of the 2κ+ 1 rounds and
therefore is a function of the position of the traps.
In general we prove that
F 2t − F 2c ≤
κ!(κ+ 1)!
(2κ+ 1)! ≡ ∆κ. (16)
The verification scheme output bit is set to
accept or reject by averaging over M repeti-
tions of the protocol and comparing our estimate
of F 2t with (1 − κN(2V + 4P )) (set by com-
pleteness). By Hoeffiding’s inequality repeating
M = log(1/β)/(2κ2N2(V + P )2) times gets us
κN(V + P )-close in our estimation with confi-
dence 1 − β. Therefore, F 2t − F 2c ≤ κN(3V +
5P ) + ∆κ. This means that for the total vari-
ation distance we have an upper bound, which
gives the soundness parameter ε of Def. (3)
var ≤ ε =
√
κN(3V + 5P ) + ∆κ.
5 Fault-tolerant Verification of Ising
Sampler
Ensuring NV and NP in Theorem 1 to be con-
stant will get harder experimentally for increasing
N . Therefore, we present two new fault-tolerant
verification schemes where the total noise scales
linearly with the size, and prove that it provides
a distribution that is hard to sample from classi-
cally upto constant additive error. We then prove
that noise scaling with system size does not pre-
vent us from verifying the prover’s distribution
with completeness and soundness parameters in-
dependent of the problem size.
Quantum fault tolerance strategies such as due
to RHG [63] can overcome the challenge of noise
scaling with system size. This involves gate dis-
tillation requiring adaptive operations which are
beyond the Ising sampler. On the target com-
putation, our fault tolerant verification schemes
overcome this adaptivity by using arguments for
free postselection due to Fujii [32] as applied to
the verification of quantum supremacy. On the
trap computation, we do not require any adap-
tivity since we chose it to be Clifford. This keeps
our fault tolerant verification schemes within the
Ising sampler, allowing verification of quantum
supremacy in the presence of total noise scaling
linearly with the size. Note that a non-Clifford
trap computation would suffer due to nonadap-
tivity. Time complexity of the quantum oper-
ations in the protocol is constant and the num-
ber of qubits needed is O(NPolyLog(N)) [63], the
polylogarithmic overhead coming from the prop-
erties of the topological code and the use of con-
catenation in the distillation procedure.
The next issue of fault-tolerant thresholds leads
to two fault-tolerant versions of the protocol in
Fig. (2) and described in detail in Sections 5.1
and 5.2. The first is called Protocol 2a. It em-
ploys the full RHG encoding in the traps lead-
ing to the threshold of thres = 0.75% [63], the
same threshold as for universal quantum compu-
tation. This is worse than the suggested improve-
ments in the noise thresholds for unverified quan-
tum supremacy [32]. However, our next protocol,
Protocol 2b, provides thres = 1.97% for verified
quantum supremacy, which is an underestimate
because of the analytical treatment and could po-
tentially be improved by numerical simulation as
in Ref. [63].
To achieve this threshold, Protocol 2b, replaces
error correction with error detection when per-
forming the RHG encoding on the trap qubits.
This is possible because the trap qubits are iso-
lated and can be retransmitted individually with-
out affecting the rest of the trap computation.
The numerical value is obtained by performing a
threshold calculation of applying the RHG encod-
ing in MBQC (Appendix C). A similar procedure
was performed in the circuit model by Fujii [32].
The cost of maintaining the same completeness
and soundness as in Protocols 1 and 2a is to re-
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place κ in Fig. (2) by Mκ, where M is an extra
overhead in the number of qubits depending on
the code minimal distance d between and around
the defects and the noise parameters V and P .
For example, with d = 2 and V = P =  as the
following fractions of the noise threshold, we have
 thres/20 thres/50 thres/100
M 3× 108 2863 54
Improvement in M may also be possible with
judicious braiding or using an alternative topo-
logical code.
An additional intricacy needs resolving for
both fault-tolerant protocols. Since blindness
is an ingredient in our verification scheme, its
straightforward application (on the logical level)
risks leaking the logical measurement angles in
the distillation procedure, where many copies of
the same magic state need to be sent. Also,
for the distillation procedure to be effective, we
need to reveal information about the state dis-
tilled. Our stratagem for circumventing this is
to apply blindness on the lowest level of MBQC,
on which the fault-tolerant construction is based.
The traps are applied at the logical MBQC level,
since those are the qubits needing protection from
noise, as outlined in Fig. (7).
Ising Sampler and Trap Computations MBQC
(Logical layer)
Protected topology using defects
Blind 3D cluster-state MBQC
(Physical layer)
Figure 7: Layered structure of verifiable FT computa-
tion.
Our proof of the classical hardness of Ising sam-
pling in this case (Theorem 3) relies on prov-
ing the completeness and soundness of verifying
conditional probabilities (Theorem 2). They are
proved in Section 5.1.
Noise is again of the form of Eqn. (9). Suppose
the verifier’s noise in each qubit preparation is
local, bounded by V < thres, the threshold and
does not depend on the secret parameters. As-
sume the honest prover’s noise in each elementary
operation is bounded by P < thres. In order to
prove Theorem 2 we make the extra assumption
that verifier’s noise is independent of the secret
parameters.
In the following theorem, ′′ is the error rate
of the code and scales down exponentially with
distance parameter d. Let qnsy(x|y = 0) be the
experimental and qexc(x|y = 0) the exact distri-
bution of the Ising sampler, when they are con-
ditioned on the syndrome measurement outcome
y giving the null result. The theorem holds for
both Protocol 2a and 2b.
Theorem 2 (Fault-tolerant verification scheme).
There exists a verification scheme with Protocol
2a/2b, M = log(1/β)/(2′′2) and l = (1 − 2′′),
that according to Def. (4), which is based on the
variation distance between conditional probabili-
ties qnsy(x|y = 0) and qexc(x|y = 0), is
(1− β, 1−
√
′′)− complete
and
(1− β,
√
3′′ + ∆κ)− sound
where ∆κ = κ!(κ+ 1)!/(2κ+ 1)!.
5.1 Protocol 2a
The fault-tolerant computation scheme used is
the one proposed by RHG [63]. Single qubit
preparation/distillation, entangling gates (cX)
and Pauli X measurements are topologically pro-
tected using the three dimensional lattice shown
in Fig. (8) and measurement-based implementa-
tion of the topological operations (more details on
Figure 8: 3D cluster state used in the RHG code using
MBQC. Blue dots are the qubits that represent the pri-
mal cubic lattice edges (or equivalently the dual cubic
lattice faces) and red dots are the qubits that repre-
sent the primal cubic lattice faces (or equivalently the
dual cubic lattice edges). Entangling operations (cZ)
are represented by blue lines. On the right hand side
you can see the primal and dual cubes, as are adapted
from Refs. [30, 63].
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|+〉 • T X
|+〉 • T X
|0〉 T X
|+〉 • T X
|0〉 T X
|0〉 T X
|0〉 T X
|+〉 • T X
|0〉 T X
|0〉 T X
|0〉 T X
|0〉 T X
|0〉 T X
|0〉 T X
|+〉 • • T X
|0〉
Figure 9: Distillation step [11]. A logical |+〉 is produced
using the (15, 1, 3) quantum Reed-Muller code. Then a
transversal T gate applied using the technique of Fig-
ure (10), stabilizer measurements and teleportation to
an auxiliary qubit gives a ‘cleaner’ magic state (up to
Pauli Z correction on the teleported qubit) when the
error syndromes are correct. Everything is topologically
protected. Picture adapted from Ref. [34].
the MBQC implementation of the RHG code see
[30], [31]). Universality comes from topologically
protected concatenated distillation (Fig. (9)) of
magic states:
|Y 〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ i |1〉), |A〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ eipi4 |1〉)
which are generated by single physical qubit
measurements. Using the logical distilled magic
states and the gate teleportation model one can
implement a universal set of gates (Fig. 10). One
can simulate an MBQC computation by using
these gates and Pauli measurements and conse-
quently add a forth dimension to the system,
which comes from the flow of the logical MBQC
operations (notice that this layer is distinct from
the physical MBQC layer on which the topolog-
ical code is implemented). The exact usage of
RHG encoding in our FT verification scheme de-
pends on whether we use error correction or er-
ror detection in our trap computation, giving two
separate protocols.
Our first fault-tolerant protocol follows the
protocol for the non-fault-tolerant verification of
quantum supremacy, introduced in Sec. 4 but
using fault tolerance.
Protocol 2a:
1. Trapification: Verifier selects a random or-
dering of 2κ+ 1 sufficiently large 3D graphs
of Fig. (8), one for the target computation
and 2κ for the trap computations. In the
target computation round the logical com-
putation is the same as the one in the non-
fault-tolerant protocol (see Fig. (1)). In the
trap computation rounds, the logical graph
contains isolated traps in the same config-
uration as in the non-fault-tolerant version
(see Fig.( 3)). We call this the logical layer
of our protocol.
2. Generation of the ‘topological code-
compatible’ circuit: The above MBQC
patterns contain |±φ〉measurements that are
not compatible with the topological code.
We directly translate the MBQC patterns
into a circuit with the same operations, with
the difference that the measurements are
replaced by teleportation of distilled |+φ〉
states followed by Pauli X measurements.
Since our rotations are multiples of pi/8, |A〉
magic states need be replaced by 1√2(|0〉 +
ei
pi
8 |1〉) states, gate teleportation is as de-
scribed before (Fig. (10)) with a T gate in-
stead of a S gate correction and distillation
based on (31, 1, 3) instead of (15, 1, 3) quan-
tum Reed-Muller code. Adaptive T gates are
not applied since we want to keep the model
instantaneous - this will be accounted for in
our supremacy proof. To avoid adaptivity
in distillation we fix which magic states we
keep for the next level of distillation indepen-
dently of the syndrome measurements out-
comes - this is not a problem because we have
‘free’ postselection on the syndrome mea-
surements of the target computation (regis-
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|ψ〉 Z
|Y 〉 • X Z S |ψ〉
(i)
|ψ〉 Z
|A〉 • X S T |ψ〉
(ii)
|ψ〉 Z
|+〉 • X I |ψ〉
(iii)
Figure 10: (i), (ii) Gate teleportation (up to global
phase) using magic states |Y 〉 , |A〉, (iii) State telepor-
tation using auxiliary state |+〉 that mimics gate telepor-
tation (via blindess). These operations are applied in a
topologically protected way, both during state distillation
using ‘impure’ states and to implement the correspond-
ing logical operations during computation using distilled
states.
ter y).
Even the |±〉 measurements of the traps
use inputs that go through the distillation
and teleportation procedure (Fig. (10) (iii)).
This is in order for the physical attacks to
have the same effect on the target and trap
computation at the logical level (see proof of
verifiability for more).
3. Topological translation: The topological
translation from the circuit to the topology
is straightforward [30].
4. Blind implementation of topology: The
topological code is implemented at the phys-
ical level by MBQC using the 3D-graphs, so
that we can implement them blindly using
the following encryption.
(a) Verifier prepares, one by one, the pre-
rotated physical qubits |+θ〉, θ ∈R
{0, pi4 , 2pi4 , . . . , 7pi4 }, needed for the blind
implementation of the topological pro-
tected computation on the three dimen-
sional cluster states and sends them
to the prover. Blindness, induced by
the random rotations, hides from the
prover the physical operations applied
and therefore the logical structure of
the computation in the topologically
protected (vacuum) and isolated qubit
region. In particular, the prover is not
able to distinguish between implement-
ing distillation and teleportation of a
magic state or a |+〉 state used for com-
putation and testing respectively.
(b) Verifier sends all the encrypted mea-
surement angles δi = θi+(−1)r′iφi+ripi
for ri, r′i ∈R {0, 1}. Parameters ri, r′i
are classical one-time pads for the mea-
surement outputs.
(c) Prover runs the computation, by entan-
gling, measuring all at once and return-
ing the results.
(d) Verifier classically corrects the returned
outcomes using the correction proce-
dure of the quantum error correcting
code used in distillation and the topo-
logical code and undoes the r, r′ pad.
(e) Verifier accepts the outcome, which is
the logical output string x and syn-
drome measurement bit y (y = 0 no er-
ror, y = 1 error) of the target computa-
tion, if all the results of the logical trap
computations are correct, otherwise re-
jects.
Completeness of the protocol follows the same
analysis as in the non-fault-tolerant case. We can
eliminate the pre-rotations by the θ’s of the com-
putation in the lower level MBQC due to θ be-
ing in δ and, then, the computation is correct up
to Pauli Z corrections before the measurements.
Local noise is taken care of by the error correc-
tion if it is lower than the threshold of the RHG
code. This avoids scaling issues that we had in
the non fault-tolerant protocol. In particular be-
cause of fault tolerance we get var ≤ √′′. Com-
pleteness means that our scheme should also ac-
cept with high probability and this is achieved by
setting the limit to accept the fidelity estimate
to (1 − 2′′). By repeating N = log(1/β)/(2′′2)
times gets us
√
′′-close in our estimation with
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confidence 1− β. Thus, this is a lower bound on
the probability our scheme accepts in the case of
completeness.
The proof of soundness is similar to the non
fault-tolerant case since the noise can be consid-
ered part of the prover’s attack that has the same
effect on the target computation and the trap at
a logical level. We show this in Appendix D.
The threshold of this protocol is the same as
the threshold of the RHG code since error correc-
tion is used in the trap rounds.
5.2 Protocol 2b
We now adapt Protocol 2a to work with error de-
tection and attain a better threshold. The main
idea is that because the traps are isolated qubits
one can look at the syndrome measurements of
all trap computations and pick from each compu-
tation only the logical trap qubit measurements
that are correct individually.
The traps in this case test topologically pro-
tected qubits of the graph state that implements
the target computation together with the distil-
lation. This is because we want to have smaller
traps, in terms of number of physical qubits, com-
pared to Protocol 2a where a trap can be as large
as a magic state distillation circuit. This is cru-
cial because by employing error detection and re-
transmission, one needs to resend one logical trap
every time at least one syndrome measurement
in the topologically protected region around the
trap fails (we limit this overhead to M times).
To avoid the trap computation being distin-
guishable from the target, we implement the traps
as if all qubits have an injected singular qubit,
but the injected singular qubit is prepared in the
|+〉 state and therefore the logical input remains
the logical |+〉. The underlying MBQC blindness
hides the qubit that is injected. Each trap com-
putation is now performed M times.
Protocol 2b:
1. Generation of the ‘topological code-
compatible’ MBQC pattern: Verifier se-
lects a random ordering of 2κM + 1 suffi-
ciently large 3D graphs of Fig. (8), one for
the target computation and 2κM for the trap
computations. For the target computation
round: The Ising sampler MBQC pattern
of Fig. (1) is translated into a ‘topological
|+〉 • X
|+〉 • • • X
|+〉 • X
|+〉 • X
|+〉 • • • X
|+〉 • X
(a)
|+〉 • X
|0〉 Z
|+〉 • X
|0〉 Z
|+〉 • • • X
|0〉 Z
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 11: (a) ‘H’-shaped building component of brick-
work state. (b) Same with cNOT gates where the con-
trol is always |+〉 and the target always |0〉. (c) Transla-
tion into prime (blue)/dual (red) topologically protected
qubits. (d) Prime/dual colouring of the topologically
protected brickwork state.
code-compatible’ one, i.e. an MBQC pat-
tern where qubits are prepared as |+kpi/8〉
states and always measured in the {|±〉} ba-
sis. This translation is possible using again
circuits similar to Fig. (10). Notice that this
introduces some adaptive T gates that we
cannot perform if we want to keep the model
instantaneous - this will be accounted for in
our supremacy proof. Moreover, topologi-
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cal protection requires the distillation of the
magic states and this can also be translated
into an MBQC pattern. To avoid adaptiv-
ity we fix which magic states we keep for the
next level of distillation independently of the
syndrome measurements outcomes - this is
not a problem because we have ‘free’ post-
selection on the target computation (regis-
ter y). The final MBQC pattern can be
also standardised to the form of a brickwork
state so that it can be trapified shown as in
Fig. (3).
2. Trapification: The target computation is
the MBQC pattern generated in the previ-
ous step. For the trap round, as shown in
Fig. (3), we have two types of trap com-
putations by isolating qubits of the brick-
work state. This is also ‘topological code-
compatible’. Qubits are prepared in the |+〉
or |0〉 state and are measured in the {|±〉}
basis. Notice that in the trap rounds there
is no adaptivity. We call this the logical layer
of our protocol.
3. Topological translation: As shown in
Fig. (11) one can translate the ‘topologi-
cal code-compatible’ MBQC pattern into a
topology that conforms with the topological
code. To avoid leaking any information con-
cerning when magic states or dummy qubits
are injected, we inject a physical qubit at
every logical qubit. Thus, we use the same
topology to inject |+〉 (which is equivalent
to not injecting anything in the topology
of Fig. (11)) or |0〉 or a magic state when
needed.
4. Blind implementation of topology: In
order to implement the above topology
blindly, so that the prover does not know
which physical states we inject, we chose to
implement it on MBQC and use the follow-
ing encryption.
(a) Verifier prepares, one by one, the pre-
rotated physical qubits |+θ〉, θ ∈R
{0, pi4 , 2pi4 , . . . , 7pi4 }
(b) Verifier sends all the encrypted mea-
surement angles δi = θi+(−1)r′iφi+ripi
for ri, r′i ∈R {0, 1}. Parameters ri, r′i
are classical one-time pads for the mea-
surement outputs.
(c) Prover runs the computation, by entan-
gling, measuring all at once and return-
ing the results.
(d) Verifier classically detects the errors in
the returned syndrome measurements
of the trap computations after undo-
ing the r, r′ pad. From the set of the
κM logical trap qubits corresponding to
each position in the trap graph it selects
κ correct ones. This is possible, on av-
erage, ifM is large enough as described
at the end of Appendix C. This results
in the quantity ∆κ in Theorem 2 being
averaged over the noise distribution.
(e) Verifier accepts the outcome, which is
the logical output string x and syn-
drome measurement bit y (y = 0 no er-
ror, y = 1 error) of the target computa-
tion, if all the results of the logical trap
computations are correct, otherwise re-
jects.
The proof of correctness and soundness are
identical to Protocol 2a.
6 Noisy Computational Supremacy
Assuming the following conjectures, the quantum
computational supremacy theorem (Theorem 3)
for the noisy case holds.
Conjecture 1 (Average-case hardness). For 0 ≤
α1, β1 ≤ 1, approximating the probability distri-
bution of the Ising sampler by papx(x|y = 0) up
to multiplicative error
|papx(x|y = 0)−qexc(x|y = 0)| ≤ α1qexc(x|y = 0)
in time poly(|x|, 1/α1, 1/β1) is #P -hard for at
least a fraction β1 of x instances.
Conjecture 2 (Anti-concentration). There exist
some 0 ≤ α2, β2 ≤ 1, 1/α2 ∈ poly(1/β2) such
that for all x
prob
(
qexc(x|y = 0) ≥ α22N
)
≥ β2 (17)
The above encapsulate two properties for the
Ising sampler: the worst to average case hard-
ness equivalence for multiplicative approxima-
tions and the probability anti-concentration con-
jecture.
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Theorem 3 (Fault-tolerant hardness). Assume
that Conjectures 1 and 2 hold. Then sam-
pling from the output distribution of the exper-
imental Ising sampler qnsy(x, y) with a classi-
cal machine, assuming a (ε′, ε)-sound verification
scheme (Def. 3/Def. 4) accepts with
ε ≤ (β1 + β2 − 1− 2
−N )α1α2
2 , (18)
implies, with confidence ε′, a collapse in the poly-
nomial hierarchy to the third level.
In order to have a scheme with positive sound-
ness parameter ε, we need our conjectures to sat-
isfy β1 + β2 − 2−N ≥ 1.
The proof uses Stockmeyer’s theorem [69],
which is based on a hypothetical machine and
predicts, if classical sampling is possible, the col-
lapse of the polynomial hierarchy to the third
level. The collapse of the infinite polynomial hier-
archy at any level is considered a highly unlikely
event in computational complexity theory.
6.1 Proof
Compared the the FT hardness proof of [32], our
proof is for the more general case of additive
as opposed to multiplicative approximation, thus
answering an open question of that paper.
We follow a similar line of reasoning as the orig-
inal translationally invariant Ising sampler [36] -
proof by contradiction. The main difference is
that we use probabilities conditioned on null syn-
dromes. Other differences include adding expla-
nation of intermediate steps, a discussion about
obfuscation and breaking the original single Con-
jecture into two separate ones: one for anti-
concentration and one for average case hardness.
We also follow a line similar to an earlier result
[12]. Compared to that result our proof does not
assign specific numbers to the parameters of the
conjectures, but states them in a parametrised
fashion.
The following proof holds for a verification
scheme according to Def. 4. In the case of a ver-
ification scheme of Def. 3 the same proof holds,
replacing varPost with var and setting qnsy(y =
0) = 1.
Proof of Theorem 3. If we can classically sample
from qnsy(x, y) (which means that our quantum
computer could be a classical impostor), then
estimating the probabilities of the distribution
with exponential accuracy is in #P : We can con-
struct a polynomial time non-deterministic Tur-
ing machine that uses the sampler as an oracle
that accepts when a specific string is sampled, so
that the probability of that event could be esti-
mated, if we could count the accepting branches.
We could also estimate the marginal probabilities
qnsy(y) in such a manner. Notice that we could
not apply the same argument for the quantum
sampler since we cannot extract its randomness
as input to build the oracle. From Stockmeyer’s
theorem [69], there exists an FBPPNP machine
that can compute explicitly the values papx(x, y),
such that for every x, y
|papx(x, y)− qnsy(x, y)| ≤ q
nsy(x, y)
poly(N) . (19)
The same can be applied in calculating the
marginals. Thus a FBPPNP machine can cal-
culate qnsy(y = 0), the probability of accepting
the syndrome measurements, with accuracy of
the same scaling as the joint probability.
Using the fact that qnsy(y = 0) is non-zero (it
is lower bounded by (1 − )N , so one can get
a non-zero estimate in #P and approximate it
using Stockmeyer) it is easy to prove that for
conditional probabilities,
|papx(x|y = 0)− qnsy(x|y = 0)| ≤ q
nsy(x|y = 0)
poly(N) .
(20)
Applying the triangle inequality, for every x
the distance between the values papx(x|y = 0)
and the exact conditional probability qexc(x|y =
0) of the Ising sampler is
|papx(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)|
≤ |papx(x|y = 0)− qnsy(x|y = 0)|
+|qnsy(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)| (21)
≤ q
nsy(x|y = 0)
poly(N) + |q
nsy(x|y = 0)
−qexc(x|y = 0)|. (22)
Assuming an (ε′, ε)-sound verification scheme
has accepted, it follows that |qnsy(x|y = 0) −
qexc(x|y = 0)| ≤ 2ε, with confidence ε′.
Obfuscation of the probability estimated in
this model comes by construction. We can pick
a computational branch (x1, . . . , xm(n−1)) and fi-
nal layer output string (xn, . . . , xmn) to estimate
at random, without revealing any information to
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the sampler. This is possible because the uni-
form distribution over branches (see Eq. (10) in
Section 4.2) is created within a fixed instance of
the Ising sampler, with no extra input provided
to the sampler. The expectation of varPost over
the uniform distribution on x is ≤ 2ε2mn , where
m,n are the dimensions of the logical ‘extended’
brickwork state and N = mn.
Markov inequality relates the probability of a
random variable exceeding a certain value with
its expectation. For a random variable X and
γ > 0,
prob(X ≥ γ) ≤ E(X)
γ
. (23)
Applying the Markov inequality to the second
term in Eqn. (22)
prob(|qnsy(x|y = 0)−qexc(x|y = 0)| ≥ γ) ≤ 2ε2Nγ .
(24)
By changing variables
prob (|qnsy(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)|
≥ 2ε2Nγ
)
≤ γ (25)
or
prob (|qnsy(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)|
≤ 2ε2Nγ
)
≥ 1− γ. (26)
Condensing this with Eqn. (22),
prob
(
|papx(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)| ≤
qexc(x|y = 0)
poly(N) +
2ε(1 + o(1))
2Nγ
)
≥ 1− γ, (27)
Thus, for more than 1−γ fraction of instances
of x
|papx(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)|
≤ q
exc(x|y = 0)
poly(N) +
2ε(1 + o(1))
2Nγ , (28)
which means that strongly simulating, i.e. cal-
culating the probabilities, of the Ising distribu-
tion with the above mixture of additive and mul-
tiplicative accuracy for more than 1− γ fraction
of instances of x is in the third level of the poly-
nomial hierarchy.
We use the two conjectures to continue our
proof. From Eqn. (28) and Conjecture 2, set-
ting ε1 ∈ 2ε(1+o(1))γα2 , there must be at least β2− γ
fraction of instances of x (we assume γ < β2)
such that
|papx(x|y = 0)− qexc(x|y = 0)|
≤ q
exc(x|y = 0)
poly(N) + ε1q
exc(x|y = 0) (29)
≤ (o(1) + ε1)qexc(x|y = 0). (30)
Let Conjecture 1 hold with β1 ≥ 1− (β2−γ)+
2−N and α1 ∈ o(1) + ε1. These imply for the
soundness parameter
ε ≤ (β1 + β2 − 1− 2
−N )α2α1
2 , (31)
which is positive for β1 + β2 − 2−N ≥ 1.
Then, there exists at least one instance
for which the multiplicative approximation the
FBPPNP Stockmeyer machine have calculated
is #P -hard.
Then, PH ⊆ P#P ⊆ PFBPPNP ⊆ ΣP3 , where
the first inclusion is given by Toda’s theorem, and
the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the third
level, an event expected to be highly unlikely.
Our average case conjecture is implicitly con-
tained in a stronger conjecture that includes anti-
concetration in [36]. Notice that our average case
conjecture, however, applies to a slightly different
distribution. The difference is that, in our case,
we can have extra rotations on some of the mea-
surement angles, as a consequence of not applying
the correction gates conditioned on the measure-
ment outcome of the teleportation step of the FT
gates (Fig. (10) (ii)). This issue will affect the
implementation of the measurements with non-
zero angles in the extended brickwork state (Fig-
ure 1 (ii)). Assuming magic |+pi/8〉 states are
used for the implementation of the pi/8 rotations
(
√
T gates), the byproduct is a k0pi/4 rotation on
the measurements of the brickwork state vertices
(Fig. (1) (i)), for some k0 which depends on the
measurement outcomes of the magic state tele-
portation steps. The original argument made in
[36] to support their average case conjecture re-
lies on the fact that from random measurement
outcomes of the vertices of the extended brick-
work state, a uniform rotation over the 8 different
{kpi/4} angles is produced on the brickwork state.
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The argument is that this corresponds to random
circuits which will likely produce highly entangled
states (see also p. 7 in Supplemental Material of
Ref. [36]). In our case it is the same, because
the extra rotations cannot change the uniformity
of these angles. Thus, the computation applied is
based on a random brickwork MBQC pattern and
connections to the random circuit model, such
as in [9], can be made. In the latter paper, the
average hardness of sampling from a random cir-
cuit is supported by drawing connections to quan-
tum chaos and some numerical evidence. In an-
other recent result ([10]), average-case hardness
has been proven for random circuits for the exact
case.
7 Discussions
Quantum computational supremacy demonstra-
tion is believed to be easier than universal quan-
tum computing since it may not have to ful-
fil atleast one of DiVincenzo’s criteria. Our
work shows that fault-tolerant verifiable quantum
supremacy is quantitatively easier than fault-
tolerant universal quantum computation in terms
of thresholds. This relies on combining the notion
of post-selected thresholds with trap-based veri-
fication which allows error-detection-based fault
tolerance to combat noise. Such a combination is
not known to exist for other quantum verification
methods. In the trap-based verification schemes
we use, it is the isolatable nature of the traps that
enables error-detection-based fault tolerance.
The techniques developed here have a wide
range of applicability. We apply it to the Ising
sampler as a specific example of a model for
quantum supremacy. For example, they could
be applied in implementations of the Boson
Sampling model [1] in a fault-tolerant quantum
computer based on qubits [61]. Our methods
should also apply to the random circuit IQP
model [14] which, in the ‘graph program’ imple-
mentation [67] requires a smaller than the Ising
sampler, but non-planar, resource state. Finally,
it can be applied to recently studied quantum
supremacy architectures on low-periodicity pla-
nar lattices [7]. The only requirement for our
isolated trap computation technique is that the
underlying graph state is bipartite. Thus, it can
even be used to simplify the original verification
protocol [29] for a universal quantum computer,
in the case it runs a classical output problem,
and use our technique to implement it in a fault-
tolerant way.
Trap-based techniques require blindness, which
is not believed possible with a classical veri-
fier [3, 59]. Even verification protocols that do
not require blindness, such as [4], still need some
level of quantum encryption. This is true for
any protocol based on quantum authentication
schemes [6], made possible by a quantum veri-
fier. Verification protocols with classical verifiers
exist [52, 65, 67], but require extra assumptions
such as additional computational hardness con-
jectures or non-communicating provers respec-
tively. For general reviews of blind and verifiable
protocols see Refs. [28, 38].
Our work is one of the first on fault-tolerant
verification, which was known to be a challeng-
ing open question. Another recent progress [33]
presents a fault-tolerant verification technique for
universal MBQC that requires the verifier to per-
form measurements, as opposed to preparations
as in our scheme. Our scheme is complemen-
tary to contemperaneous work on composable
verification of IQP, which is a classical hypoth-
esis test with the verifier preparing perfect sta-
bilizer states and the prover using a non-planar
graph [57]. A formal proof of composability of
our protocol is a desirable next step and may be
developed using the methods given in [24].
A direction for future investigation should be
the potential of other known fault-tolerant quan-
tum codes in providing improved post-selected
thresholds, as well as the search for quantum
codes for non-universal models. Another direc-
tion should be the study of known quantum
supremacy models for which a verifiable version
using the same restricted physical assumptions as
the original exists [45], as well as the development
of such new non-universal models. More techni-
cally, an open problem for our verification scheme
is to find a graph state with local rotations being
only multiples of pi/4 and still generate random
universal logical measurement angles as in the ex-
isting scheme. This will make the fault-tolerant
version easier because it will be based on more
standard magic states. Also, other universal con-
structions with xy-plane measurements can also
be considered [53, 55].
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A Bridge and break operators and the Ising Sampler
To understand the procedure of carving a specific graph out of a square lattice state by using only
xy-plane measurements, we explain two types of operations originally introduced in [29, 43].
The first is break operators. Let i be a vertex we want to remove from the original graph, together
with the connection to its neighbours. One can achieve this by performing a Pauli Z measurement
on the qubit that corresponds to i and discard the outcome. However, we do not have the power to
perform measurements out of the xy-plane in our protocol, otherwise we risk revealing the position
of the traps by asking the prover to change the basis. Pauli Z-measurements can be simulated by
preparing dummy qubits in the |0〉 state. Then,the cZ gate applied by the prover has no effect in
entangling it with its neighbours. The measurement can have any arbitrary rotation since the qubit
is isolated and does not participate in the computation. In order to keep the whole procedure blind
we instead prepare the qubit in state |di〉 for di chosen independently and uniformly at random from
{0, 1}. This ensures that the state is identical to the maximally mixed state, as is the case for the
other qubits in a blind protocol. Also, we apply on each of its neighbours Pauli operation Zdi , before
sending them to the prover, so that we cancel the effect that the prover’s entangling will have on that
neighbour.
The second is called bridge operators. Let i be a vertex of degree 2 that we want to remove in the
original graph and join its neighbours by an new edge. To achieve this we apply a Pauli Y measurement
(measurement angle pi/2) on the qubit that corresponds to vertex i and add pi/2 on the angles of each
the two neighbours. Conditioned on this measurement giving 0 the resulting graph, when we trace
out the measured qubit, is the desired one. If the measurement outcome is 1 then, in order to get
the correct graph, we need to apply a Z correction on the neighbours. Since our Ising sampler model
is nonadaptive and all our measurements are in the xy plane we can achieve this by flipping the
measurement outcomes of the corresponding qubits. Notice that this is not an issue in the trap rounds
that we explain in Section 4.1 since there are no bridge operations in this case.
B Proof of soundness in Theorem 1
Proof. Let UP (r,d) denote the correct unitary operation of the protocol. It includes everything
preceding UB in Fig. (6), and we have only included in the arguments the random parameters that
will be averaged over later. The vector r contains as elements bits ri, r′i, where i ranges from 1 to
(2κ+1)N (22(2κ+1)N possible values) and the vector d contains as elements bits di, where i ranges again
from 1 to (2κ + 1)N (for the non-dummy qubits we assume fixed di = 0, thus 2κN possible values).
The rest of the random parameters are the vector θ which contains elements θi ∈ {0, pi8 , 2pi8 , . . . , 15pi8 }
for 1 ≤ i ≤ (2κ + 1)N (16(2κ+1)N possible values) and the vector t which contains the indices of the
positions of the traps in all 2κ trap systems and takes all
(2κ+1
κ
)
(κ + 1) possible values allowed by
the construction. The distributions over all the possible values of the above random parameters are
uniform.
In the honest case, after UP (r,d) is applied, the state of the trap system becomes ρt =⊗
i∈t Zri |+〉i 〈+|i Zri , where the index i takes values from the elements of t that represent the posi-
tions of the traps. In the dishonest case (again based on Fig. (6)), tracing out the prover’s private
system, the deviation UB becomes an arbitrary CPTP map denoted by E . The probability of getting
all zeros of the trap system ρ′t, right after the measurements, can be written as
F 2t ≡
∑
r,θ,t,d
p(r,θ, t,d)Tr
(⊗
i∈t
Zri |+〉i 〈+|i Zriρ′t
)
(32)
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=
∑
r,θ,t,d,b
pTr
⊗
i∈t
Zri |+〉i 〈+|i ZriTr{i:i/∈t}
⊗
i
Zbi |+〉i 〈+|i ZbiE
UP (r,d) ⊗
i/∈m(t)
|+〉i 〈+|i
⊗
i∈m(t)
|0〉i 〈0|i UP (r,d)†
⊗
i
|δi(θi, ri)〉 〈δi(θi, ri)|
)⊗
i
Zbi |+〉i 〈+|i Zbi
))
(33)
where the inner trace in the formula is taken over all the systems except the trap system. The vector
b has been introduced, where elements bi are bits which correspond to the results of measurements of
bits i for 1 ≤ i ≤ (2κ+ 1)N . The probability p comes from the uniform distribution over all possible
values of the random parameters and is therefore 1/(22(2κ+1)N2κN16(2κ+1)N
(2κ+1
κ
)
(κ+1)). Also,m(t)
are the positions of the dummy qubits for a choice of trap positions t.
Summing over θ’s creates the maximally mixed state for the δ’s and summing over the r’s and d’s of
the computational system and the dummy system creates the maximally mixed state for those systems.
This is because just before the application of deviation operator these systems are not entangled with
the trap system and at the same time a quantum one-time-pad is applied on them. We can therefore
trace them out and update the CPTP map E to a new CPTP map E ′ that applies on the remaining
system (of dimension 2N ′) and does not depend on the secret parameters.
The CPTP map E ′ can be written as a Kraus decomposition, where the Kraus operators {Eu} obey∑
uEuE
†
u = I2N′ , where I2N′ is the identity on a 2N
′ dimension system. Each Kraus operator can be
further decomposed into the Pauli basis as Eu =
∑
k au,kPk, where {Pk} are all generalized elements
of the Pauli basis applying on a 2N ′ dimension system and {au,k} are complex coefficients. Also, we
remind the reader that the φ parameters of the trap qubits are all zero and therefore the remaining
honest operation consists only of the rotations by the r parameters.
F 2t =
∑
rt,t,bt
p(rt, t)Tr
(∑
u
4N′∑
k=1
4N′∑
l=1
au,ka
∗
u,l
⊗
i∈t
Zri |+〉i 〈+|i Zri
⊗
i∈t
Zbi |+〉 〈+|ZbiPk|iZri |+〉i 〈+|i ZriPl|i
Zbi |+〉 〈+|Zbi
)
, (34)
where Pk|i denotes the Pauli operator that applies on qubit with index i from the generalized Pauli
basis operator Pk. Because of the state of the system, in particular the fact that X |+〉 = |+〉, we can
add ‘free’ Pauli X operators randomized by new parameters r′ taken uniform at random.
F 2t =
∑
rt,r′t,t,bt
p(rt, r′t, t)Tr
(∑
u,k,l
au,ka
∗
u,l
⊗
i∈t
Zri |+〉i 〈+|i Zri
⊗
i∈t
Zbi |+〉 〈+|Xr′iZbiPk|iZriXr
′
i |+〉i 〈+|i
Xr
′
iZriPl|iZbiXr
′
i |+〉 〈+|Zbi
)
(35)
By changing variables b′i = bi + ri and applying the cyclic property of the trace to move ZriXr
′
i
around
F 2t =
∑
rt,r′t,t,b
′
t
p(rt, r′t, t)Tr
(∑
u,k,l
au,ka
∗
u,l
⊗
i∈t
|+〉i 〈+|i
⊗
i∈t
Zb
′
i |+〉 〈+|Xr′iZb′i+riPk|iZriXr
′
i |+〉i 〈+|i
Xr
′
iZriPl|iZb
′
i+riXr
′
i |+〉 〈+|Zb′i
)
(36)
Applying the Pauli twirl lemma [21], proven in Appendix E, by averaging over rt, r′t, we get
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F 2t =
∑
t,b′t
p(t)
∑
u,k
|au,k|2
∏
i∈t
| 〈+|i Zb
′
i |+〉 〈+|Zb′iPk|i |+〉i |2
=
∑
t
p(t)
∑
k
|αk|2
∏
i∈t
| 〈+|i Pk|i |+〉i |2, (37)
where |αk|2 =
∑
u |au,k|2 and
∑
k |αk|2 = 1 from the unital property of the attack.
A similar analysis is applied to calculate the average fidelity Fc = F (ρc, ρ′c) of
the computational state after the measurements. In the honest case the computational
state ρc just before the measurement will be disentangled from the rest of the system:⊗
i∈c ZriXr
′
iRz(φi)Xr
′
i |G〉 〈G|⊗j∈cXr′jRz(−φj)Xr′jZrj , where c(t) are the positions of the computa-
tional qubits for a choice of trap positions t and |G〉 〈G| is the computational graph state. The latter
can be expressed as EG
⊗
i∈c |+〉i 〈+|iE†G, where EG denotes all entangling operators cZ that apply
on a graph G. In the dishonest case, for an attack E the fidelity F¯c is
Fc ≡
∑
r,r′,θ,t,d
p(r, r′,θ, t,d)F (ρc, ρ′c) (38)
=
∑
r,r′,θ,t,d
p(r, r′,θ, t,d)Tr
(
(ρcρ′c)1/2
)
(39)
≥ Tr

 ∑
r,r′,θ,t,d
p(r, r′,θ, t,d)ρcρ′c
1/2
 (40)
= Tr
 ∑
r,r′,θ,t,d,b
p
⊗
i∈c
ZriXr
′
iRz(φi)Xr
′
i |G〉 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Xr
′
jRz(−φj)Xr
′
jZrjTr{i:i/∈c}
(⊗
i
Zbi |+〉i
〈+|i ZbiE(UP (r, r′,d)
⊗
i/∈m(t)
|+〉i 〈+|i
⊗
i∈m(t)
|0〉i 〈0|i UP (r, r′,d)†
⊗
i
|δi(θi, ri, r′i)〉 〈δi(θi, ri, r′i)|)
⊗
i
Zbi |+〉i 〈+|i Zbi
))1/2 . (41)
Summing over the θ’s of the δ’s and the r’s and the d’s of the trap and the dummy system creates
the maximally mixed system for these systems which can be traced over. Expressing the attack on
the remaining system (of dimension 2N ′) using the Kraus decomposition with each Kraus element
decomposed in the Pauli basis we get as before
Fc ≥ Tr
(( ∑
t,rc(t),r
′
c(t),bc(t)
p
∑
u
4N′∑
k=1
4N′∑
l=1
au,ka
∗
u,l
⊗
i∈c
ZriXr
′
iRz(φi)Xr
′
i |G〉 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Xr
′
jRz(−φj)Xr
′
jZrj
⊗
i∈c
Zbi |+〉 〈+|ZbiPk|iZriXr
′
iRz(φi)Xr
′
i |G〉 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Xr
′
jRz(−φj)Xr
′
jZrjPl|jZbi |+〉 〈+|Zbi
)1/2)
.(42)
By changing variables b′ = b+ r and applying the cyclic property of the trace
Fc ≥ Tr
(( ∑
t,rc(t),r
′
c(t),b
′
c(t)
p
∑
u
4N′∑
k=1
4N′∑
l=1
au,ka
∗
u,l
⊗
i∈c
Xr
′
iRz(φi)Xr
′
i |G〉 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Xr
′
jRz(−φj)Xr
′
j
⊗
i∈c
Zb
′
i
|+〉 〈+|Zb′i+riPk|iZriXr
′
iRz(φi)Xr
′
i |G〉 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Xr
′
jRz(−φj)Xr
′
jZrjPl|jZb
′
i+ri |+〉 〈+|Zb′i
)1/2)
.(43)
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Using Corollary 1 in Appendix E and the cyclic property of the trace and sum over rc(t), we can
eliminate all Pauli X operators of the attack that differ in the two sides (we denote this by replacing
the summation over l with a summation over lx where the element Pl agrees with Pk on all the Pauli
X components). We also use the cyclic property of the trace to get
Fc ≥ Tr
(( ∑
t,rc(t),r
′
c(t),b
′
c(t)
p
∑
u
∑
k
∑
lx
au,ka
∗
u,l 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Xr
′
jRz(−φj)Xr
′
j
⊗
i∈c
Zb
′
i |+〉 〈+|Zb′iPk|iXr
′
iRz(φi)
Xr
′
i |G〉 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Xr
′
jRz(−φj)Xr
′
jPl|jZb
′
i |+〉 〈+|Zb′i
⊗
i∈c
Xr
′
iRz(φi)Xr
′
i |G〉
)1/2)
. (44)
Then, the Xr′i (Xr
′
j ) operators that are next to |G〉 (〈G|) can be rewritten as Pauli Z operators on
their neighbours, which then commute with z rotations and the attack (since the Pauli X operators of
the attack are the same from both sides) and with the projectors Zb′i |+〉 〈+|Zb′i , by changing variable
b′′i = b′i + r′i, and cancel each other. The Xr
′
i operators that are next to projectors Zb′i |+〉 〈+|Zb′i
commute with them trivially
Fc ≥ Tr
(( ∑
t,r′
c(t),b
′′
c(t)
p
∑
u
∑
k
∑
lx
au,ka
∗
u,l 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Rz(−φj)
⊗
i∈c
Zb
′′
i |+〉 〈+|Zb′′i
Xr
′
jPk|iXr
′
iRz(φi) |G〉 〈G|
⊗
j∈c
Rz(−φj)Xr
′
jPl|jXr
′
iZb
′′
i |+〉 〈+|Zb′′i
⊗
i∈c
Rz(φi) |G〉
)1/2)
. (45)
Then we can use again Corollary 1, but with Q, Q′ being Pauli Z+identity operators and {Pi} all
tensor products of PauliX+identity operators, and sum over r′c(t) to eliminate the Pauli Z components
of the attack the differ in the two sides. Thus, given that ∑u,k |au,k|2 = 1 from the unital property of
the attack, the attack becomes a convex combination of Pauli operators:
Fc ≥
( ∑
t,b′′
c(t)
p(t)
∑
u,k
|au,k|2|
⊗
i∈c(t)
〈+|iE†G
⊗
i∈c(t)
Rz(−φi)Zb′′i |+〉 〈+|Zb′′i Pk|iRz(φi)EG
⊗
i∈c(t)
|+〉i |2
)1/2
(46)
The Pauli X component of Pk|i can be replaced by I since the only effect is, depending on b′′i , to
change the sign of the quantity inside the absolute and the sign is eliminated. Then, we can sum over
the b’s to get identity and since E†GRz(−φi) now commutes with the attack Pauli operators, it cancels
with Rz(φi)EG. Also, as before, we set |αk|2 =
∑
u |au,k|2
F 2c ≥
∑
t
p(t)
∑
k
|αk|2
∏
i∈c(t)
| 〈+|i Pk|i |+〉i |2. (47)
It is easy to see by the symmetry of the trap construction that, for attacks that are exactly the same
on any of the 2κ+ 1 graphs of the different the rounds of the protocol e.g. stochastic noise, Equation
37 and Equation 47 give the same result when averaged over t. However, one needs to deal with more
clever attacks which attack a different qubit at every round trying to coincide with dummies instead
of traps with non-zero probability, i.e. for some of the possible permutations of the 2κ+ 1 graphs.
We now show that for κ ≥ 1 the maximum of F 2t − F 2c for all possible deviation strategies is
∆κ ≡ κ!(κ+ 1)!(2κ+ 1)!
The attack is a convex combination of Pauli operators, thus it suffices to find the Pauli operator
that maximizes F 2t −F 2c . The maximum comes from the attack that touches all 2κ+ 1 rounds. In this
case, F 2c is lower bounded by 0 and F 2t comes from the probability the attack does not coincide with
any trap in the 2κ trap computation rounds. There are 2κ+ 1 ways of picking the target computation
round, which fixes the positions of the 2κ trap computation rounds. The choice of the even/odd parity
positions for the traps is fixed not to coincide with the attacks. Further simplification can be done
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by observing that only the attacks on κ + 1 of the same kind (even or odd) and κ of the other, are
successful. By attacking κ+ 2 or more of the same kind they are guaranteed to hit a trap of the same
kind, independently of the position of the target. This reduces the possible ways of picking the target
to κ+ 1, which gives a bound of κ+1(2κ+1κ )(κ+1)
, equal to the value of ∆κ above.
To conclude the proof we show that for all other attacks F 2t −F 2c is non-positive and thus estimating
F 2c through F 2t is a conservative estimation. We begin by arguing that there is no benefit for the
attacker to touch more than one qubit of each round, since the lower bound of the fidelity F 2c contains
products of terms that can be 0 or 1 and thus it suffices to make one term 0 to make the product 0.
By symmetry of the construction it does not matter which particular qubit the attacker touches but
only whether it is an odd or even position qubit at each round. Let λ be the number of rounds that
are attacked.
Assume, without loss of generality, the first ξ rounds are attacked on an even qubit, where ξ ≤ κ
otherwise it will certainly hit a trap, and λ − ξ ≤ κ for the same reason. Also, assume ξ ≥ (λ − ξ)
without loss of generality.
For index k to correspond to an attack on λ rounds
F 2c,k ≥ 1−
λ
2κ+ 1 =
2κ+ 1− λ
2κ+ 1 (48)
There are
(2κ+1
κ
)
(κ + 1) possibilities for the selection of traps. In order to count the combinations
of attacks not affecting the traps, we identify two cases, (i) the target is in the attacked rounds (λ
possible positions) and there are
(2κ+1−λ
κ−ξ
)
possible placings of the remaining traps in the non-attacked
positions, (ii) the target is not in the attacked rounds (2κ + 1 − λ possible positions) and there are(2κ−λ
κ−ξ
)
possible placings of the remaining traps in the non-attacked positions:
Ft,k =
λ
(2κ+1−λ
κ−ξ
)
+ (2κ+ 1− λ)(2κ−λκ−ξ )(2κ+1
κ
)
(κ+ 1)
(49)
We show that for λ ≤ 2κ we have Ft,k − Fc,k ≤ 0.
λ
(2κ+1−λ
κ−ξ
)
+ (2κ+ 1− λ)(2κ−λκ−ξ )(2κ+1
κ
)
(κ+ 1)
− 2κ+ 1− λ2κ+ 1 ≤ 0⇔
(2κ− λ+ 1)(κ+ ξ + 1)(2κ−λκ−ξ )
(κ− (λ− ξ) + 1)(2κ+1κ )(κ+ 1) −
2κ+ 1− λ
2κ+ 1 ≤ 0⇔
(2κ− λ+ 1)(κ+ ξ + 1)(2κ− λ)!(κ!)2
(κ− (λ− ξ) + 1)(2κ+ 1)!(κ− (λ− ξ))!(κ− ξ)! ≤
2κ+ 1− λ
2κ+ 1 ⇔
(κ+ ξ + 1)(2κ− λ)!(κ!)2
(κ− (λ− ξ) + 1)(2κ)!(κ− (λ− ξ))!(κ− ξ)! ≤ 1 (50)
For κ = {1, 2} it is easy to verify the expression directly. For the general case we rewrite the above
as:
(κ+ ξ + 1)[(κ− ξ + 1) · . . . · κ][(κ− (λ− ξ) + 1) · . . . · κ]
(κ− (λ− ξ) + 1)(2κ− λ+ 1) · . . . · 2κ ≤ 1 (51)
where we have 1 + ξ+ (λ− ξ) = 1 + λ terms on the numerator and 1 + λ terms in the denominator.
For the LHS of the above equation we have
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≤ (κ+ ξ + 1)(κ− (λ− ξ) + 1)2ξ
≤ (κ+ ξ + 1)(κ− ξ + 1)2ξ (52)
It suffices to show that the above is ≤ 1 for all allowed values of κ and ξ. We can rewrite it as:
(κ+ ξ + 1)
(κ− ξ + 1) ≤ 2
ξ ⇔ (53)
1
ln(2) ln(
κ+ 1 + ξ
κ+ 1− ξ ) ≤ ξ ⇔ (54)
2
ln(2)artanh
(
ξ
κ+ 1
)
≤ ξ (55)
which is true for κ ≥ 3, ξ ≤ κ. This concludes our calculation of the bound ∆κ.
The rest of the proof is given in the main text.
C Calculation of FT Threshold for Protocol 2b
Since the logical graph is the brickwork state, its topological implementation will be on MBQC, as
shown in Fig. (8), and will have the structure of Fig. (11).
Noise considered is local, unital and bounded. It applies after every elementary operation (prepara-
tion, entangling and measurement) j and is expressed as a CPTP superoperator:
Nj = (1− )I + Ej (56)
where ||Ej || = , where we set  = V = P to calculate a common threshold for the verifier and the
prover.
For the fault tolerant noisy, but honest, probability distribution post-selected for null syndrome
measurement qnsy(x|y = 0), and the exact one qexc(x) we reproduce the derivation of Ref. [32].
∑
x
|qnsy(x|y = 0)− qexc(x)| =
∑
x
∣∣∣∣∣Tr(PxQy(ρsparse + ρfaulty))Tr(Qy(ρsparse + ρfaulty)) − qexc(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
x
∣∣∣∣∣ Tr(PxQyρfaulty)Tr(Qy(ρsparse + ρfaulty)) − (1− b)qexc(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ (57)
Here, Px is the projector to result x for the output register and Qy is the projector to null syn-
drome for the post-selection register. The output quantum state of the sampler, just before the final
measurements, can be written as a sum of two matrices: ρsparse that is the sum of the states on which
apply the components of the noise operators Nj (i.e. either component (1 − )I or component Ej for
each j) that, under postelection for y = 0, do not produce a logical error in the output distribution,
and ρfaulty which contains the sum of the states on which apply the rest of the noise components (for
more detail see [32]). Thus, Tr(PxQyρsparse) ∝ qexc(x). Term b, which is defined by:
b = Tr(PxQyρsparse)
Tr(Qy(ρsparse + ρfaulty))qexc(x)
(58)
is therefore independent of x.
By applying triangle inequality and by observing that the trace terms are positive
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∑
x
|qnsy(x|y = 0)− qexc(x)| ≤ Tr(Qyρfaulty)
Tr(Qy(ρsparse + ρfaulty))
+ (1− b)
Since
∑
x
Tr(PxQy(ρsparse+ρfaulty))
Tr(Qy(ρsparse+ρfaulty)) = 1, we have 1− b =
Tr(Qyρfaulty)
Tr(Qy(ρsparse+ρfaulty)) .
Also we have Tr(Qy(ρsparse + ρfaulty)) ≥ (1 − )N . This comes from the fact there is at least
one selection of components of the noise operators Nj that results in the null syndrome and this is
components (1− )I, ∀j, giving a term with trace (1− )N . Thus
∑
x
|qnsy(x|y = 0)− qexc(x)| ≤ 2Tr(ρfaulty)/(1− )N (59)
In the case of the topological code the errors are created by error chains L of length greater than
Ld, which is the minimum of the distance between two defects and the size of defects. Matrix ρfaulty
can be decomposed into terms ρLfaulty with respect to error chains L of length L so that:
Tr(ρfaulty) ≤
N∑
L=Ld
∑
L:|L|=L
Tr(ρLfaulty) (60)
≤
N∑
L=Ld
∑
L:|L|=L
(1− )N
|L|∏
j=1
||Ej ||
1−  (61)
=
N∑
L=Ld
∑
L:|L|=L
(1− )N
(

1− 
)|L|
(62)
The number of error chains of length |L| in the 3D lattice of size n is poly(n)(6/5)5|L|, which is the
number of self avoiding walks [22]. Thus the gap
∑
x |qnsy(x|y = 0)− qexc(x)| is bounded by
≤ 2
N∑
L=d
poly(N)(6/5)5L
(

1− 
)L
(63)
which converges to zero if /(1 − ) < 1/5. The threshold comes from the self-avoiding walks that
affect the singular qubits and surpass the distillation threshold, where a more careful counting needs
to be done [32] to get /(1 − ) < 0.134 or  < 0.118. This calculation of the threshold [32] is
an underestimate because of the assumption that error correction is done on primal and dual cubic
lattices independently.
However, the above calculation is under the stochastic phenomenological noise model that does not
account for the noise in the individual operations that compose a syndrome measurement. In our case,
the topological code is implemented on the MBQC model where physical noise should be at least 6
times less than phenomenological noise. This is because there are typically 6 operations involved in a
syndrome measurement: 1 syndrome qubit preparation, 4 entangling operations with the surrounding
qubits (less on boundaries) and 1 syndrome measurement. This gives us threshold thres = 0.0196943.
The overhead of the error detection scheme comes by counting the number of error syndromes that
are influencing one trap by catching potentially detectable errors (chains of size ≤ d). This is the area
of dimension d around the defect qubits and their ‘past’ in terms of MBQC flow (physical layer) which
we choose in the smallest of the three dimensions of the topological code. In Fig. (11)(c) we depict
the logical qubits (made of prime/dual physical defects) that compose a ‘H’ shaped component of the
brickwork state. In our trappification scheme any topologically protected qubit can be a trap. For a
worst case analysis we consider the biggest logical qubit, in terms of number of defects that make it,
which is a prime qubit in our example (bottom middle blue loop in Fig. (11)(c)).
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The number of syndrome measurements (cubes) will depend on the distance parameter d. Since
the counting of syndromes is involved we give an example for fixed values, d = 2 and physical noise
 = (1/20)thres. In this case the number of syndromes is at most 564 and the number of repetitions
is M = 1/(1 − pc)564, where pc is the probability of a cube syndrome failing. Probability pc is given
by (1− (1− 2(6))6)/2, which is the probability of having an odd number of errors in the 6 faces of a
cube. This gives M ≈ 3× 108. Overheads for other fractions of the threshold for noise appear in the
main text.
D Proof of Theorem 2 soundness
Proof. To establish soundness we need to show that a lower bound in the fidelity on the target
computation round and the acceptance probability of the trap computation rounds are the same
averaged over the random parameters.
The total variation distance between the experimental (noisy and potentially dishonest) distribution
of the Ising sampler qnsy(x|y = 0), where y = 0 implies conditioning on the null syndrome, and the
exact one qexc(x|y = 0) = qexc(x) after the measurements is
varPost = 12
∑
x
|qexc(x|y = 0)− qnsy(x|y = 0)| = 12
∑
x
∣∣∣∣qexc(x)− qnsy(x, y = 0)qnsy(y = 0)
∣∣∣∣ (64)
= D
(
ρc,
ρ
′post
c
qnsy(y = 0)
)
(65)
≤
√√√√1− F 2(ρc, ρ′postc
qnsy(y = 0)
)
(66)
=
√√√√√√1− Tr2

√√√√ ρcρ′postc
qnsy(y = 0)
, (67)
where ρc is the correct state and ρ
′post
c the experimental state, post-selected on the null syndrome
measurements, after all measurements. For the rest of this section we denote qnsy(y = 0) as q′0 for
simplicity.
For the target round, the average fidelity Fc is calculated in the physical level of the computation
as in the non-fault-tolerant case. The qubits are pre-rotated by θi, or flipped by di in the case of
dummies.
Noise can enter either during the state preparation from the verifier, or during the single round
elementary MBQC operations (entangling and measurement) of the prover. We assume a noise model
which is local, unital and bounded, so that standard fault tolerance techniques are applicable. Noise
can always moved after every elementary operation on qubit j and expressed as a CPTP superoperator
applies only on the state of qubit j:
Nj = (1− )I + Ej (68)
where ||Ej || ≤ thres.
Crucially, we assume that the noise during the preparation does not have any dependence on the
secret parameter θi.
Moving all the noise operators just before the measurement, results to a different set of local, unital
and bounded operators N ′j , collectively represented as N ′.
We apply the same twirling steps as in the proof of Theorem 1 to twirl the CPTP map that is the
composition of the attack and the noise. Notice that the twirl on the post-selected qubits is trivial
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since there is no sum over b′i. Thus,
F 2c
(
ρpostc ,
ρ
′post
c
q′0
)
≥ 1
q′0
∑
t,b′
c(t)
p(t)
∑
u,k
|au,k|2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⊗
i∈c(t)
〈0|i
⊗
i∈c(t)
〈+|iE†G
⊗
i∈c(t)
Rz(−φi)Zb′i |+〉i 〈+|i Zb
′
i
Pk|iRz(φi)EG
⊗
i∈c(t)
|+〉i
⊗
i∈c(t)
|0〉i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (69)
where b′i’s take fixed values in the sum for the syndrome measurements such that the syndrome
indicates null errors.
The only (noise and attack) Pauli operators that have an effect on the above quantity are tensor
products of identity and Pauli Z. These operators flip the measurement outcome of the particular
qubit. Detectable attacks disappear because of the projector to null syndromes. The undetected
attacks that come from operators Pk|i can be written as logical bit flips on the subsequent measure-
ments - since it will affect the classical post-processing. Also, the normalization factor vanishes when
we trace over the syndrome systems.
Therefore, at the logical level
F 2c ≥
∑
t,b′′
c(t)
p(t)
∑
u,k
|au,k|2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⊗
i∈c(t)
〈0|Li
⊗
i∈c(t)
〈+|Li E†LG
⊗
i∈c(t)
Rz(−φLi )Zb
′′
i L |+〉L 〈+|L Zb′′i L
PLk|iRz(φLi )ELG
⊗
i∈c(t)
|+〉Li
⊗
i∈c(t)
|0〉Li
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
, (70)
We can now sum over the index b′′c(t) to simplify the expression, by cancelling also the rotation and
entangling operators. On the logical dummy system the logical Pauli Z attacks have no effect, therefore
it has trace 1 and can be simplified to
F 2c ≥
∑
t
p(t)
∑
u,k
|au,k|2
∏
i∈c(t)
| 〈+|Li PLk|i |+〉Li |2. (71)
The same technique can be employed for the trap rounds, with the difference that instead of post-
selection there is error correction for Protocol 2a and error detection for Protocol 2b that results in
the same logical state for the same (noise and attack) Pauli operators.
From completeness we have set the limit of acceptance of the fidelity estimate to (1 − 2′′). By
repeating N = log(1/β)/(2′′2) times gets us
√
′′-close in our estimation with confidence 1−β. Thus,
with this confidence we get bound varPost ≤ √3′′ + ∆κ.
E Channel Twirl Lemma
The following lemma is used in the verifiability proofs.
Lemma 1.
4n∑
i=1
PiQPiρPiQ
′Pi = 0, if Q 6= Q′ (72)
where ρ is a matrix of dimension 2n × 2n, Q, Q′ are two arbitrary n-fold tensor products of
Pauli+identity operators {I,X, Y, Z}, and {Pi} is the set of all n-fold tensor products of Pauli opera-
tors and the identity {I,X, Y, Z}.
A proof of this lemma is also provided in Ref. [21].
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Proof. We can write Q as ZaXa′ = Za1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ ZanXa′1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Xa′n , for arbitrary binary vectors
a = (a1, . . . , an), a′ = (a′1, . . . , a′n), and similarly Q′ = ZbXb′ . Assuming Q 6= Q′, either a 6= b
or a′ 6= b′. Summing over all Pk,k′ ’s which are the n-fold tensor products of the form ZkXk′ =
Zk
′
1 ⊗ . . .⊗ Zk′nXk1 ⊗ . . .⊗Xkn for binary vectors k = (k1, . . . , kn),k′ = (k′1, . . . , k′n), we get
∑
k,k′
Pk,k′QPk,k′ρPk,k′Q
′Pk,k′
=
∑
k,k′
ZkXk′ZaXa′ZkXk′ρZkXk′ZbXb′ZkXk′ (73)
=
∑
k,k′
Zk(Xk′ZaXk′)Xa′ZkρZk(Xk′ZbXk′)Xb′Zk (74)
=
∑
k,k′
Zk((−1)k′·aZa)Xa′ZkρZk((−1)k′·bZb)Xb′Zk (75)
=
∑
k,k′
(−1)k′·(a⊕b)Za(ZkXa′Zk)ρZb(ZkXb′Zk) (76)
=
∑
k′
(−1)k′·(a⊕b)
∑
k
(−1)k·(a′⊕b′)ZaXa′ρZbXb′ (77)
If either a 6= b or a′ 6= b′ the summation ∑k′((−1)k′·(a⊕b)) or ∑k((−1)k·(a′⊕b′)) is equal to zero
respectively, because (in either case) exactly half of the elements of the summation will be −1 and
half will be 1. Therefore, since our assumption was that either a 6= b or a′ 6= b′ or both, the whole
expression equals zero.
Corollary 1.
2n∑
i=1
PiQPiρPiQ
′Pi = 0, if Q 6= Q′ (78)
where ρ is a matrix of dimension 2n × 2n, Q, Q′ are two arbitrary n-fold tensor products of Pauli X
and identity operators {I,X}, and {Pi} is the set of all n-fold tensor products of Pauli Z and identity
operators {I, Z}.
Proof. Since Q 6= Q′, Lemma 1 gives
4n∑
i=1
PiQPiρPiQ
′Pi = 0 (79)
where {Pi} is the set of all n-fold tensor products of the Pauli operators and the identity {I,X, Y, Z}.
But since Q and Q′ have only identity and Pauli X tensor elements the Pauli X operators of {Pi}
commute with Q and Q′ on each side and give identity.
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